OVERVIEW
The European Space Agency with its "Earth watch" and "Earth Care" programs will provide a huge series of earth observation satellites throughout the next 10 years, carrying instrumentation in a wide range of spectral bands and different mission profiles. In addition, the GMES program established by ESA and the European Commission (EC) will provide new verification tools to contribute to the precise monitoring of compliance with international agreements, such as the Kyoto protocol on climate change, as well as security and international aid agreements. All running and future programs will more and more rely on the security and secrecy of data collected by "sentinel" like satellite platforms or constellations. Both can be achieved by applying cryptographic protection to the data. Typically today high throughput cryptographic processing is required to cover high data rate sensoring applications. Fig. 1 . depicts the typical link structure of an earth observation satellite. [1] , the application of crypto-systems to earth observation satellites has been analysed. The threats, security services and requirements have been evaluated and a survey of crypto algorithms and systems has been established. Based on these evaluations a selection of cryptographic elements suitable for the specific application has been performed and their feasibility under the constraints of a typical EO-Mission has been analysed.
2.
SECURITY SERVICES An information processing system, which is protected by security means will provide a combination of dedicated "security services". The user of a secured earth observation system will expect implementation of these requirements with different emphasis, depending on the role he plays within the system information chain:
User of data product (Type A): End user of the products generated by the earth observation system. The matrix shows that the data product provider has the most complete set of requirements with respect to implementation of security measures. The protection of entity rights is in the main interest of the data product provider, because he has to ensure, that the products are distributable under these aspects.
The interests of external entities also may affect the implementation of the satellite system. Some countries (e.g. US) are coupling export licences for components or parts of a satellite system with the proof of protection of entity rights by the system implementation, i.e. the security system has to be licensed according to internationally agreed standards.
THREATS AND ATTACKS
Typical threats to a satellite based information system are:
• T1 theft of information or disclosure of information to unauthorised entities • T2 corruption or modification of information • T3 interruption of services • T4 unauthorised use of system resources
The potential attacks can be categorised as: A1 passive attacks A1a eavesdropping of user data A1b eavesdropping of control and status information A2 active attacks A2a modification of data: alteration of data packages contents without detection by the system, which could be -modification of user data -modification of control/status data A2b data replay: repeating of (recorded) authorised messages at a later time, which could be -replay of user data -replay of control/status data A2c Denial of service: blocking of resources (equipment or data paths) within the system, such that the services using the resources are not properly functional A2d Masquerade: Pretending an authorised user by an unauthorised entity A2e Insider Attack: Misuse of the system by an authorised user Table 2 shows, which threats can be issued by the various attacks:
Legend: )* by replay of control/status data Masquerade and Insider Attacks are the most severe. With Replay Attacks threats like use of system resources is only partially possible but interruption of service could be easily achieved. The different attacks are also combined with different levels of difficulty to implement these attacks within the various elements of a space information system. This is connected to the data path type and to the accessibility of each element.
SECURITY MEASURES
The required security level implementation depends on the type of the mission. Earth Observation Missions can be categorised into three classes: a) Scientific Use Mission Class: Classical Agency driven mission with institutional data product end-users. b) Commercial Use Mission Class: A mission carried out as public/private partnership or purely by commercial entities with the aim of at least partly or fully commercial use of the data products. c) Dual Use Mission Class: Dual Use missions incorporate additional military data product users or governmental users with high security requirements.
In the study a link by link requirement analysis has been performed according to the aspects threats, mission classes and the resulting security services required. The paper will outline this link by link analysis.
A second focus within the study was on cryptographic techniques to implement the security service requirements. It has been analysed, how crypto systems can be used to secure earth observation missions. This can be achieved by defining add-on elements to the traditional communication links between ground and space segment.
Symmetrical Algorithms have been proposed for the user data high speed downlink. The secret keys for the user data downlink need to be updated regularly and therefore must be transferred over a secure uplink to the satellite. For the uplink, asymmetrical algorithms have been proposed for authentication and key exchange. Additional symmetrical encryption may be used in applications with high security level (e.g. dual use) for exchange of commands/housekeeping data on the low rate satellite control link.
It has been shown, that the implementation of the necessary add-on elements according to the throughput and performance requirements is feasible with today state of the art means for space applications. In principle the add-on elements can be embedded into existing communication protocols without major changes. But it is highly recommended to update the existing ESA Standard [2] for authentication on the command uplink with respect to a state of the art secure algorithm on the cost of slightly longer authentication trailers needed.
5.
